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Abstract
This paper studies a dynamic, quantity setting duopoly game characterized as follows:
Each firm produces an indivisible output over a potentially infinite horizon, facing the con-
straint that its cumulative production cannot exceed an initially given bound. The envir-
onment is otherwise stationary; the remaining productive capacities of the firms at any mo-
ment are common knowledge; the firms choose production plans contingent on these capaci-
ties which are mutual best responses in every contingency. The resulting Markov Perfect
Equilibria are analyzed using a two-dimensional backward induction, and compared with
the equilibria which emerge when precommitment to time paths of output is possible. It is
shown that the ability to precommit can be disadvantageous; that collusion in Markov
Equilibrium is facilitated by the symmetrical placement of the firms; and that having
greater capacity confers basic strategic advantage on a firm by enabling it to credibly
threaten future production. The model solves an open problem in the theory of exhaustible
resource economics by imposing subgame perfection in a resource oligopoly with indepen-
dent stocks. It also formalizes the intuition that, when indivisibilities are important, tacit
coordination of plans so as to avoid destructive competition is facilitated by establishing a
convention of "taking turns" - that is, a self-enforcing norm of mutual, alternate
forebearance.
* The author thanks Ariel Halperin, Eric Maskin, Robert Rosenthal and John Vickers for
helpful discussions; and the Bradley Foundation, the Olin Foundation, and the Center for
Energy Policy Research, MIT, for research support.
** This paper was written while the author was in residence as a Visiting Scholar at the
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I. Introduction
This paper studies tacit collusion in a dynamic model of duopoly. Firms face an
indivisibility in production at any momea,, and an intertemporal constraint on the
cumulative amount of output which is possible over the horizon of the game. The analysis
explores the strategic implications of these two conditions: On the one hand, due to the
indivisibility, a firm deciding whether to produce at a point in time has limited flexibility
to accomodate its opponent's action. On the other hand, due (say) to the presence of an
essential, limited and non-reproducible factor of production, each firm's capacity for future
production is progressively diminished by decisions it has taken to produce the past.
We study the Markov Perfect Equilibria of the resulting dynamic game when each
firm's strategy specifies a rate of production at any moment as a function of the joint cap-
acities for future production remaining as of that moment. An equilibrium is a pair of such
state-contingent rules which are optimal for each frm, given the other's strategy, from
every conceivable state. In a sense our game is a "closed-loop", "multiple stock" version of
the "oil"igopoly problem encountered in the exhaustible resources literature. 1 This is, to
our knowledge, the first treatment of perfect equilibrium in a depletable resource model
with multiple stocks. Previous work has succeeded in imposing subgame perfection only in
the context of "common pool" situations, in which there is a single limiting resource. 2
The assumed indivisibility in production further distinguishes the present analysis
from existing work in resource economics. Our firms decide whether or not to produce at
each moment, but are unable to vary the non-zero rate at which output is supplied. They
regulate an "on-off" control variable, facing a constraint on the total amount of time this
variable can be "on" over the horizon of the game. In effect, their output decisions are
'See Loury (1986), and the literature cited there.
2An early contribution was the study of competition in the exploitation of a common fishery
by Levhari and Mirman (1980). Related analyzes include Reinganum and Stokey (1985),
and the recent, more general, work of Sundaram (1989) and Dutta and Sundaram (1989).
qualitative choices about participation. The game is analogous to a dynamic Prisoner's
Dilemma in which the capacity to play "tough" in the future diminishes with an increased
frequency of having played "tough" in the past. 3 We focus on the classic question in the
study of the Prisoner's Dilemma - the extent to which, in a non-cooperation equilibrium,
the players can avoid dissipative competition through mutual forebearance.
Characterization of closed-loop equilibrium in non-zero sum differential games with
several state variables is a very formidable, largely open, problem. Explicit solutions are
rare outside of the linear-quadratic context, though a number of economically interesting
examples have been identified wi·h a special structure permitting profitable study. 4 In
this paper we make progress by simplifying the problem in two ways: As noted, we limit
the set of actions from which the players can choose at any instant; and, we assume that
actions, once chosen, must remain fixed for some (possibly quite short) interval of time.
These assumptions permit explicit solutions for perfect equilibria to be obtained.
Our ability to solve the model explicitly is exploited to pose a number of interesting
questions for which general answers are unavailable in the existing literature on dynamic
duopoly: Are firms more, or less, able to avoid mutually destructive competition when
they can, and do, commit at the initial date to specific future actions, relative to a situa-
tion in which such commitment is not possible? What is the relationship in equilibrium be-
tween the size and distribution of payoffs, on the one hand, and capacities to produce, on
the other? How will the distribution of remaining capacity evolve over time? How are
SA closely related model is the continuous time Prisoner's Dilemma game of Rosenthal and
Spady (1989). There Markov Perfect Equilibria in strategies defined on a two dimensional
state space of cumulative profits are studied.
4A good discussion of the differential game approach to dynamic oligopoly problems is in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Two linear-quadratic analyses are Fershtman and Kamien(1987), who study a deterministic, one-state-variable model of duopolistic pricing, and
Hansen, Epple and Roberds (1985), who solve a stochastic two-state-variable model of
resource depletion, though without imposing sugbgame perfection. Other models with a
structure permitting profitable study of subgame perfect equilibrium are the memoryless
patent race of Reinganum (1981), the racing model of Harris and Vickers (1985), the
capacity investment model of Spence (1979), extended in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), and
the duopoly pricing model with menu costs of Halperin (1990).
these considerations affected by the rate of discount and the elasticity of market demand?
Among the results obtained are: (1) state--contingent strategies imply equilibrium
payoffs at least as great, and often greater, than those possible with open-loop strategies;
(2) symmetry of capacities facilitates collusion in closed-loop equilibrium, but can under-
mine it when open-loop strategies are employed; (3) the extent of endowments consistent
with attaining tacit collusion in perfect equilibrium is inversely related to total capacity, to
the interest rate, and to the elasticity of demand; (4) the ability to credibly threaten future
production is a basic strategic advantage which allows the appropriation of a more than
proportionate share of the industy's total payoff. Result (1) implies that the ability to
commit at the initial date to future actions can be disadvantageous! Result (2) suggests
that, when such commitment is not possible, firms are better able to maintain high prices
to their mutual advantage if neither of them enjoys a large market share! Result (4) pro-
vides theoretical support for the common intuition that a firm with a substantial share of
total capacity (Saudi Arabia in OPEC!) can disproportionately influence the course of play.
To obtain these results we employ the two simplifications mentioned to transform a
complete information, continuous time game of dynamic duopoly into a more tractable dis-
crete time analogue. This conversion is described in section II. Perfect equilibrium in
Markov strategies is defined in section III. A two-dimensional backward induction is em-
ployed in section IV to solve for explicit equilibria, which are compared to the open-loop
Nash equilibria of the same game. In section V we consider the limit of equilibrium behav-
ior in the discrete model as period length shrinks, raising some technical and conceptual
issues discussed briefly in that and the coacluding section of the paper. 5
5Because of the indivisibility in production, coordination of play is closely linked with the
idea of "precedence" in this model. Our discrete time equilibria exploit this, and the re-
lated notion of "alternation" heavily. In continuous time, when players are free to change
their actions at any instant, it is nolonger clear how to define who produced "last period".
Thus, it is not clear how to interpret the limit, as period length goes to zero, of the discrete
time equilibria analyzed in section IV. See the treatment of extensive form games in con-
tinuous time by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for a fuller discussion of these issues.
II. The Model
We consider the following model cf competition between two independent firms, A
and B, facing an indivisibility in production, with given limitations on their cumulative
capacities to produce. Time is continuou ý over an infinite horizon, rE[O,ca). At date r the
a b
flow rates of production of firms A and B, denoted by ga and qb respectively, are such
that q =(qa, qb)E{O,1} 2; that is, either a firm is inactive, or it is producing at a unitary
rate at any moment. Q =qa +q b is the industry's production rate at -, obviously
QE {0,1,2}, Vr0O. A firm's initial capacity (or stock) is a number R. (j=A,B) denoting
feasible cumulative (resource cost of) production for that firm over the course of the game;
R-(RARB)E R2 is the vector of initial capacities/stocks. Capacity falls at a unitary rate if
a firm is active; a firm exits the game when its capacity has fallen to zero. There is no way
to add to stocks during the play of the game. The firms' stocks are common knowledge.
The demand side of the market is passively modelled; buyers do not behave strateg-
ically. There is an inverse demand function, P(-), which is time invariant and dependent
only on the total rate of flow of output of the two firms. Monetary units are such that
P(1)=1>e-P(2)>0. (For completeness, let P(O) be any finite number.) If c<1/2 then in-
dustry flow revenue falls as the rate of production increases, so we say that demand is
inelastic. If 0e1/2, then we will refer to demand as being elastic. There is no other cost of
production beyond the opportunity cost implied by the depletion of capacity. Future re-
ceipts are discounted at the common, uniform rate r>O. The firms' payoffs are simply
their respective discounted flows of revenae received over the infinite horizon as a result of
their joint paths of supply.
We study the equilibria of the follcwing discrete time analogue of the continuous
time set-up introduced above: Assume that the firms cannot change their flow rate of
output except at particular, exogenously given and uniformly spaced moments in time -
that is, except at the beginning of a "period." After any change they are bound to main-
tain their production at the new rate until the next such moment. These moments when
adjustments are permitted are common knowledge to the two firms. Let h>O be the
length of a "period" - the interval betvWeen dates when a change of action is allowed. A
discrete time dynamic game is defined fo - each value of h, whose equilibria we character-
ize. We also study the behavior which eimerges in these equilibria in the limit, as h-O0.
Suppose then that T(h)=O0, h, 2h, 3h,...} is the set of dates when new actions can
be taken. Associate with each rET(h) the integer t=r/h. We will often refer to "date
t", meaning the instant r=h-t, and to "period t", meaning the interval [h.t, h.(t+1)).
Define the discount factor J(h)-e-rh; a dollar received on date t is worth 6(h)t dollars at
date zero. Monetary flows over intervals [r,7+h), TET(h), are constant given our assump-
tions, and may be regarded as equivalent lump sums paid at the beginning of each period.
Suppose that at dates tEI the firms take the actions qt. Then their respective payoffs are
VA and VB where:
(2.1) VA = .P(Qt)]; aad VB t[qb.p()
tlI tlI
-rh
for /(h)[ 1-- ], the lump sum equivalent of the flow of one dollar over an interval of
length h. Unique payoffs are implied by every path of firms' actions via (2.1).
Given periods of length h, we consider now how the firms' productive capacities
evolve over the course of the game. Let I be the set of positive integers, and I=U{O}).
Define the initial state, so(h,R)=(ao(h,RA),bo(h,RB)), as follows: ao max{aEI a.hRA},
and b omax {bEI b. h•RB}. (We suppress explicit dependence of s0 on h and R when
that is inessential.) The initial state is a pair of integers denoting the "number of plays"
which each firm can make over the cours9 of the game, where a "play" involves supplying
output at the constant unitary rate for a period of duration h, and where we "round-off"
by neglecting the fact that the initial stocks may not be evenly divisible by h. Let SEIxl
denote the state space. In this way, for every initial vector of capacities REIR2 and every
+ vr
-1h>0, we assign an initial state s oES, representing this association by: so(h,R)h- R. It
is apparent that if st is the state of the game at date t, and if qt is the vector of firms'
actions during period t, then the state at date t+1 satisfies: st+ 1 = st - qt"
m. Markov Perfect Equilibrium
It is obvious that, for any given history of play prior to date t, the set of feasible
action paths subsequent to date t, and the firms' conditional valuations of these paths,
depend on that history only through the state of the game at t, st=(at,bt). That is, the
"state of the game", as defined here, is a "payoff relevant state" in the sense, e.g., of
Maskin and Tirole (1989): Conditional valuations are independent of the history, given the
stationarity assumed in (2.1). Feasibility depends only on whether remaining stocks are
big enough; all histories prior to t which reach the state st imply the same set of feasible
subsequent actions.
We employ the concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) for the discrete
game, with h fixed, in the analysis to follow. In general then, strategies are functions
from S into [0,1], reporting for each firm the probability of participation in the market
during a period when the state is sES. However, we shall restrict attention to pure stra-
tegy MPE. This restriction involves less loss of generality than may appear to be the case,
since pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model, and mixed strategies are ineffi-
cient here. If, at some node s, A and B play "0" with positive probability, they risk
getting "stuck" there for a period - a source of lost industry profits which does not exist
with pure strategies. Because we are primarily concerned with understanding when a rev-
enue maximizing outcome occurs in equilibrium, we restrict attention to pure strategies.
Given a pair of pure Markov strategies on S, the resulting motion through the lat-
tice during the play of the game may be envisioned as exemplified by Figure 1. At each
point sES four continuations are possible, corresponding to the four elements qE{0,1}2
These outcomes result in motion of the state from s to some successor node, s'=s-q. If,
at node s, both firms stay out of the market (i.e., q=(O,O)), then s'=s, and the state
remains where it began. With Markov strategies this amounts to remaining at s forever,
an obvious impossibility in an equilibrium unless s=(O,O). The three other continuations
correspond to one or both firms being in the market, and result in motion of the state
either "due South", "due West", or "Southwest", as depicted by the arrows in the Figure.
Eventually the state reaches one or both of the axes, representing the exit of one or both
firms. At this point, the firm with remaining capacity produces one unit in each period
until the state reaches the origin.
b .-- ---
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Thus, with each profile of pure Markov strategies and each initial state may be
associated a unique path through the lattice and, via (2.1), unique payoffs for the firms.
Given the period length, these payoffs are a function of the initial node, the strategy pair,
and the parameters f and 5. Every path terminates in a finite number of steps. Current
period payoffs (divided by 0(h)) at each node depend on the actions taken there as follows:
B
i 0
A 0 Table 1
1 0
We now procede formally, introducing some notation and definitions. Define:
=A - :S-.{0,1} 11A(0,b)=0,VbEI}, =B {B:S-4{0,1} I B(a,O)=O,VaEI}, and :-A xEB
A pure strategy profile (or simply, a profile) is an element oaE. From any state sES, every
profile aoE generates a path { so,sl,...,st,... }, defined inductively as follows:
(3.1) so = s, and
st = st- 1 -- O(st-_), tel.
We denote this sequence {st(s,a)}. We say that point s' is a successor of s under a if
s'E{s(st( a)}, and that s' is a predecessor of s under a if se{st(s',a)}. Identifying qt
in (2.1) with a(st(s,a)), we may define the value function for each firm, VA(Ta)(s) and
VB(a)(s), at state sES given profile aEE, in the obvious way, as the respective sum in
(2.1) along the path {st(s,a)}.
Definition 3.1: A strategy profile &EE is a Nash Equilibrium from seS if:
VA(L)(s )  VA(cA,'&B)(S) VAE A , and
VB(&)(s) 2 VB(rA',B)(s) VasEBB .
Definition 3.2: A strategy profile aC*EE is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if it is a Nash
Equilibrium from s, for every seS.
Let E cE be the set of all MPE's in pure strategies. Nash Equilibrium is weaker
than MPE since it requires strategies to be best responses to each other only from a partic-
ular initial state. In a NE neither firm gains by deviating from its strategy at any node
along the subsequent path, given that it anticipates the response to the deviation to be as
reported by the strategy of the other firm. Yet these responses are not themselves con-
strained, beyond feasibility, by the definition. Therefore, NE may depend on threats which
are not credible. MPE requires that promised responses to deviations must be consistent
with subsequent equilibrium play.
We now formalize the idea that a profile a is an MPE on some subset of the state
space. In the sequel we construct equilibria by finding particular strategies that are best
responses to each other from initial states in a given region of S, extending the resulting
profile to the entire state space so as to constitute a full equilibrium. We say that a set of
states W is closed to deviations from a profile a if all paths from seW generated by a
stay in W, and if one firm's deviation from such a path also yields a point in W. Denote
by oa\ the profile obtained by replacing j's strategy under a with a, j=A,B.
Definition 3.3: Given a set of states WcS and a function a:W - {10,1} 2, we say that W
is closed to deviations from a if the following condition holds:
VsEW, VAa AE VB B: {st(s,a\ aA)}cW, and {st(s,a\0B)}cW.
Definition 3.4: A strategy profile aEE is a restricted MPE on W if:
(a) W is closed to deviations from a; and
(b) a is a NE from s, VsEW.
Let E WCE denote the class of restricted MPE on W. Obviously, if aEE W, then
a' EE and a' a on W implies a'EE W. Restricted equilibria on a given set may thus be
thought of as equivalence classes of strategy profiles, in which membership is defined by
* *
agreement on the set in question. It is also obvious that if aEE then aEI W if and only
if W is closed to deviations from a. Theorem 1 establishes that every restricted MPE
can be extended to the entire state space in a manner consistent with Markov Perfection.
Consider the following simple example which illustrates the definitions. For nEI
define Sn={s=(a,b)ESI a+b<n}. Obviously, Sn is closed to deviations from any aEE (as
is any set containing the origin, and containing all points "southwest" of any point it
contains.) Now, consider the strategy profile a=(uA,aB) defined as follows: B plays
whenever he has a positive stock. A waits until B has exhausted before playing any-
thing. Let n'=Max{nEI6SnE}. Then, if n'l, we have that jEZ*Sn for 2<n<n'+l: B
cannot gain from deviating; and A will deviate only if e>6n. But it is easy to see that
eE . For max{a,b} large enough, A will deviate.
To establish that a profile a constitutes an MPE it suffices to show that, for every
sES, neither firm can increase his payoff by a single deviation from a at some point along
the path {st(s,a)}, given that a is followed by both firms after the deviation. That is,
only "one-shot" deviations need be considered. This follows from the obvious fact that, if
a sequence of deviations is desirable, it must contain a "one-shot" deviation at some node
which raises the firm's payoff. Moreover, since no firm will deviate at a node where he
alone produces, only two forms of deviation are relevant: Either o(s)=(1,1) and someone
prefers to stay out of the market, or c(s)E{(1,0),(0,1)} and the firm not producing prefers
to be active.
At the node s, for the firm A, and given the putative equilibrium profile u, to
determine if a profitable deviation is possible we need to compare two quantities: (i)
Sf+6VA(a)(s'), the current revenue flow when q=(1,1) plus the discounted continuation
value of moving from s to s' s-(1,1); and (ii) 6VA(a)(s' "), the discounted continuation
value occasioned by the actions q=(0,1) which lead to the node s' 's--(0,). If
a(s)=(1,0), A never deviates from a at s. If quantity (i) exceeds (ii) and c(s)=(0,1),
or if (ii) exceeds (i) and a(s)=(1,1), then A deviates. The analogous conditions charact-
erize the desirability of deviations for firm B.
If a profile 7 provides no incentive fcr either firm to deviate from its specified
actions at a given node, assuming it is followed thereafter, then the firms' value functions
VA(o)(s) and VB(a)(s) must satisfy standard dynamic programming conditions. Thus:
Definition 3.5: Given strictly positive sES, we say that a strategy profile aEE satisfies the
Bellman Inequalities at s if a(s)#(O,O), and:
(3.2) (a) (s)=(1,1) *
and
(b) o(s)=(0,1) 4
(c) Os=(1,0)
VA(u)(s) = fle+bVA(a)(s-(1,1)) > 6VA(a)(s--0,1)),
VB(a)(s = #e+brB()(s-(1,1)) b"B(a)(s-(1,0)).
Pe+6VA(a)(s-(1,1)) < 6VA(a)(s-{0,1))= VA(a)(s).
/3E+6VB(a)(s-(1,1)) 6VB(a)(s-(1,0))= VB(a)(s).
We summarize the foregoing definitions and discussion with the following useful result:
Lemma 1: Given
(a)
(b)
(c)
Then oEEIW. If
WcS let the profile acOE satisfy the following conditions on W:
W is closed to deviations from a;
aA(a,O)= aB(O,b)=1, at any non-zero points (a,O) and (O,b)EW;
a satisfies the Bellman Inequalities at every strictly positive seW;
a satisfies (b) and (c) on all of S, then aE .
It is possible, using a two-dimenlional backward induction, to characterize all
Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies for this game. This may be seen as follows:
For arbitrary values of VA and VB at the nodes s-(1,1), s-(1,0) and s-(0,1), there is
always some pair of actions q=oa(s) which permit the Bellman Inequalities to be satisfied
at s. That is, for s strictly positive and aEE, either both inequalities in (3.2)(a) hold or
one of them fails, in which case one of the inequalities in (3.2)(b) or (3.2)(c) holds. More-
over, VA(a)(n,O)=VB(a)(O,n)=3(1-.bn)/(1-6) for all a satisfying (b) of Lemma 1. There-
fore, starting at the point (1,1) and working systematically "backward", up and to the
right in the lattice, one constructs a pure strategy MPE by successively assigning values to
a at s, given the values already assigned at to a at s'<s, in such a way that the
Bellman Inequalities are satisfied at each step. It is possible to do this so that at each node
s, values for the functions VA(O)(.) and VB(a)(.) have already been determined at the
nodes s-(1,1), s--(1,0) and s-(0,1). Employing this induction, we prove that a restricted
MPE on a subset W of the, state space can always be extended to the entire lattice in such
a way that the resulting profile constitutes a full equilibrium on S.
Theorem 1: Given WcS and EEI W, there exists -*EE such that: or*(s)=a(s), VsEW.
Proof: See the apppendix.
Theorem 1 is an important tool which shall be used repeatedly in the sequel. We
turn now to a substantive analysis of MPE strategy profiles. The argument is constructive;
we solve the model explicitly to find state-contingent plans of action which are mutually
consistent with revenue maximization by both firms from every conceivable state. We
begin by defining tacit collusion and describing open-loop equilibrium in the model.
IV. On the Possibility of Collusion in Markov Perfect Equilibria
A. Tacit Collusion
In this simple setting, with only two possible actions, the notion of tacit collusion
takes a very primitive form. In order to maximize the sum of their payoffs the firms must
arrange to avoid supplying at the same time if that reduces discounted industry revenues.
It is obvious that the industry revenue maximizing output at any strictly positive node
s=(a,b) depends only on the total (a+b). Let Q*(s)E{0,1,2} be this optimal collusive
behavior at sES. Regarding tacit collusion (or coordination, or cooperation), we say that
the MPE aE£ achieves collusion at s if aA(s)+aB(s)=Q*(s). The region of collusion
under a, M(a), is the set of nodes at which a achieves collusion. If a path satisfies
*
{st(s,a))}M(a), sES and uEE , we call tt a collusive path. Industry revenues are maxim-
ized in the MPE a from the initial node so iff a generates a collusive path from s .
With inelastic demand it is obvious that Q*(s)=l, sf(0,0), since supplying two units
instead of one lowers both current and future revenue. With elastic demand, if s=(a,b)
and a+b is "large", then Q*(s)=2: Because of discounting, the opportunity cost of sup-
plying another unit today vanishes as total capacity grows large, while the marginal rev-
enue of two instead of one unit of output is 0(2e-1)>0. So if e>1/2 then, for some n_1,
Q*(a,b)=l1, a+b<•; and Q*(a,b)=2, a+b>E. The critical n is given as follows:
(4.1) = MaxnE 2 )} = Max{nEl ~-1 2e-1}.
That is, n is the largest total stock at which the opportunity cost of an incremental unit
of production, given that one unit is to be supplied in each subsequent period, is no less
than the marginal revenue of raising output from one to two units. With inelastic demand,
collusion in equilibrium requires the avoidance of simultaneous production everywhere.
With elastic demand, such coordination is only relevant when the total stock is less than n.
B. Collusion in Open Loop Equilibrium
In order to contrast the possibilities for collusion in Markov Perfect Equilibria with
the outcomes achieved in the open-loop (precommitment) equilibria of the same game, we
consider the latter briefly. By "open-loop:" play we mean that firms can bind themselves
at the initial date to time paths of actions which are known to both. If one firm believes
the other is so committed, then it has a corresponding path which maximizes its payoff.
With paths constrained to be compatible with the available capacities of the firms, we con-
sider the Nash Equilibria in these paths. Such an equilibrium achieves tacit collusion from
the node (a,b) if it avoids simultaneous production when to do so is necessary to maxim-
ize the sum of the firms' payoffs. The following result characterizes the region in S where
tacit collusion may be achieved using open-loop strategies.
Lemma 2: There exists an open-loop Nash Equilibrium from the strictly positive node
(a,b)ES which avoids simultaneous production everywhere along its path if and only if:
(4.2) 1½Max{a,b} + Min{a,b} < n' = Max{nelj n>}.
Proof: In an open-loop Nash Equilibrium neither firm wishes to shifts a unit of output
from its last date of positive supply to its first date of zero supply. Letting the difference
in these two dates for either firm be 0, such a shift pays if c>6 . So an open-loop equi-
librium without simultaneous production is impossible if e> b for some firm, along every
path where one or the other, but not both of them, supplies on successive dates. Consider
the problem of finding a sequence of a "l's" and b "0's" such that the larger of: (1) the
difference in order between the last "1" and the first "0"; and (2) the difference in order
between the last "0" and the first "1"; is minimal. Denote this minimal difference by
.a,b). Thinking of this sequence as the time path of supply for firm A in an open-loop
equilibrium from initial node (a,b) which avoids simultaneous production, we see that
neither firm will deviate if _(a,b)<n'. The reader can verify that the minimal difference
(a,b) is realized by placing the lesser in number of the two digits in the middle of the
sequence and surrounding them as evenly as possible on either side by the other digit.
Assuming that a>b, and that a is even, this is illustrated in Figure 2:
1 1, 1 ... 1, 0 0, ...0, 1 1 1, ... 1
a/2 b a2
Figure 2
Examination of this Figure shows that this disposition cannot be improved upon, and that
_.a,b) = Min{nEIln > ½Max(a,b)+Min(a,b)}. 0
With open-loop strategies each firm takes the other's path as given, and so anti-
cipates no consequence of an increase in current supply besides a reduction of its own cap-
acity for future production. So the "shadow price" on a marginal unit of capacity is the
present value of revenue from the last unit sold. There exist endowments from which each
firms' initial shadow price on marginal capacity is less than E, its marginal revenue at zero
output, along every collusive path. From such endowments, for which (4.2) fails, both
firms produce on the initial date in every open-loop equilibrium. (Note: 2n'_<n.) So,
whatever the elasticity of demand, total size and relative symmetry of capacities can
militate against achieving maximal indus-ry revenues in an open-loop equilibrium.
C. Precedence and Alternation with Markov Strategies
We will show that something close to the opposite of the foregoing is true regarding
collusion in Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Our method is constructive; we shall exhibit a
particular equilibrium profile to establish this point. Intuitively, closed-loop strategies are
more effective at achieving coordination because, by making the entire future course of the
game contingent upon current actions, they can impose on the firms a cost of increased out-
put far greater than the foregone discounted revenue from the last unit sold. We demon-
strate formally in Proposition 1 that when total production capacity is arbitrarily large,
implying a vanishingly small shadow price for the marginal unit, if capacities are relatively
symmetric and the periods short, the firms can always coordinate their actions tacitly so as
to maximize discounted industry revenue in a non-cooperative, perfect equilibrium.
A key concept in this construction is the notion of "turn-taking". With {0,1}
actions and Markov strategies, colluding to maintain a high price amounts to specifying
regions of the state space within which one firm has precedence, and the other is expected
to forebear. Along a collusive path, one firm produces until a node is reached which signals
the other's "turn", the other then produces until the state passes out of its region of
precedence, and so on. In equilibrium the firm without the turn must prefer forebearance
to "playing out of turn."
A special case of this turn-taking partition might be called "pure alternation,"
where the firms share the market by producing on alternate dates. To motivate the
alternating strategy profile, consider a one-shot game with payoffs as given in Table 1.
This game has (1,1) as its strictly dominant Nash Equilibrium, providing each firm with a
return of E. Suppose that the firms were to encounter this game over an infinite sequence
of periods, with 6 being their common discount factor. For small e the one-shot equi-
librium would imply substantial losses. Both firms would be much better-off if they could
coordinate their actions so as to avoid "head to head" competition, yet each prefers to
supply in the current period. Resolution of this Prisoner's Dilemma-like problem requires
that the firms reach some tacit agreement as to who will supply, and when.
A natural understanding which might develop between them in such a situation is:
"Whoever produced last period stays out this period". If the discount factor is not too low
it will be better to wait until tomorrow for one unit of revenue, and the implied oppor-
tunity to wait yet again the day after tomorrow, than to claim E units of revenue every
day. It is easy to see that such an alternating convention, supported by the threatened
punishment of reverting to "(1,1) forever" if deviation occurs, is a subgame perfect equi-
librium of the infinitely repeated game if and only if "waiting to alternate" is better than
"competing forever". That is, if and only if: -(1+2+64+...) = 6/(1-62) _ l/(1-6). Or,
(4.3) ( < 6
This condition is important in the analysis of Markov Equilibrium to follow. Note that it
holds with inelastic demand if the periods are short enough, but never with elastic demand.
Return now to the dynamic game with cumulative capacity constraints which we
have been considering. Formally, define a profile uaE as an alternating strategy profile if,
for all strictly positive sES: o(s)+c(s-o(s))=(1,1). The path {st(s,o)} therefore involves
the firms supplying the market alternately in successive periods for as long as both have
positive stocks. There are exactly two such profiles, distinguished by which of the firms
supplies when the stocks of ooth are positive and their sum is an even integer. We assume
without loss of generality that firm A produces under the alternating strategy profile
when the sum of positive stocks is even, and denote the corresponding profile by &EE.
Notice how the reduction of the continuous game to one in discrete time with a countable
state space, induced by the assumption th:at actions cannot be instantly changed, is being
heavily exploited in defining this form of precedence.
Figure 3
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Take an arbitrary point seS, and zonsider the set of all successor nodes to s under
&, which we call the alternating path from. s, denoted {st(s,&)}. These paths have a stair-
step appearance, and include nodes along the axes leading to (0,0). Figure 3 illustrates
several alternating paths. Notice that these paths, regarded as subsets of S, are closed to
deviations from &, VsES. A deviation from & means either remaining at s, or "jumping
ahead" to s-(1,1). By definition of &, s-(1,1)=[s-&(s)-&(s-&(s))]=s2(s,&)E{st(s,&)}, for
s>>(0,0), so a deviation from & always leads to a node belonging to its alternating path
through s. (Indeed, only an alternating strategy profile generates paths which are closed
to deviation from itself.) A useful way tc state this fact is that, along any alternating
path, the consequence of deviation from "waiting one's turn" is always to "lose one's turn."
It is easy to see that the turn-taking convention represented by & is not an MPE.
For if 5a< it must be that UA(a,1)=l, Vcr•,oE By playing "1" at (a,1) A guarantees
itself a payoff of at least 3[E+6(1-l-1)/(1-6)] which exceeds ob(1-f6a)/(1-6), the best it
can get from playing "0." Since &A(a,1)=0 when a is even, it follows that &E .
Nevertheless, there is some non-trivial subset of nodes, implicitly defined as follows, from
which the alternating profile & is a restricted MPE:
Definition 4.1: For & as above and 0<e<1 define the region of alternation, O(e), by:
O(C) E {sESIVs'e{st(s,T)} , if (s')=0, then Vj(J)(s')<6-JL[-, j=A,B}.
* $
Theorem 2: &XE (E). Moreover, if &6EYIW then WC 9.(e). That is, .(c) is the larg-
est subset of S on which a mutual agreement to "take turns" could be self-enforcing.
Proof: .(e) is the countable union of alternating paths, each of which is closed to devi-
ations from a. Therefore O.(e) is closed to deviations from &. The Theorem then follows
from Lemma 1, if we can show that Bellman Inequalities (3.2)(b or c) are satisfied at every
strictly positive node sE O(e). If firm j "waits its turn" at s its payoff there is V.j()(s).
If it deviates by playing "out of turn" it receives Pe immediately, but loses the oppor-
tunity to have the market to itself next period. This continuation yields the payoff
Pe+bVj(d7)(s-(1,1)). But, because it is waiting to have the market to itself, it must be that
Vj(b)(s)= 6. [+ bVj(&)(s-(1,1))]. So the deviation pays iff Vj(b)(s)> bi( ). Thus,
.O(c) is, by definition, precisely the set of nodes where deviation from & does not pay. o
This result leads to the following general rule about turp-taking: A firm "waits its
turn'- for one period if the value of that turn, when it does come, does not exceed the value
of receiving, in perpetuity, the revenue loss to the other firm caused by it having played
out of turn. Moreover, the argument for this general rule only used the alternating prop-
erty of &r "locally," at a node s and its immediate successor. So we have the following
partial converse of Theorem 2, relevant whenever precedence changes hands.
Corollary 1: Suppose uEE . Then a(s) + a(s-a(s)) = (1,1), and aj(s)=O imply that
Vj(a)(s)<_(.), for jE{A,B} and seS.
The next result provides an explicit description of .O(e). We also introduce nota-
tion which will be used extensively in the sequel. Recall that n'=Max{nEII Sen>}.
Definition 4.2: For s=(a,b)ES define n(s)=la-b|, and k(s)=min{a,b}. Let j(s)denote
the larger firm and i(s) the smaller firm at s, i,jE{A,B}. (Explicit dependence of these
functions on s will often be suppressed.) Define the function 4(n,k) as follows:
(4.4) (n,k) - 2k-2. 6 + (1 6 2k-2).(1 I), for nEl and kel.
Corollary 2: .(e)={seSIVkEI, k<k(s): .(n(s)+1,k)>e if &j(s)(S)=O0, and 4(n(s),k)>e if
cri(s)(s)=0}. Moreover, when (4.3) holds then O(c)={sESIVtO0, n(st(s,&))•n'}.
Proof: See the appendix.
With indivisible production forebearance, by one firm or the other, is essential if
they are to share the market and maintain a high price. Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 imply
that such restraint is consistent with the firms' interests only if the "contingent right to
produce" has been allocated in such a way that payoffs never exceed 0( 5). Any greater
return is too large for a firm to be willing to "wait its turn" to receive it. Now the region
9.(E) consists of nodes from which this criterion is satisfied at every point along the path
generated by &. Thus, if the initial node s0E .(c) we say that alternation is implement-
able (in MPE), meaning that a tacit agreement to share the market through simple "turn-
taking" could be implemented by a state--contingent, self-enforcing rule. Corollary 2 shows
how the implementability of this norm depends on the size and distribution of capacitities.
If demand is sufficiently inelastic, in that (4.3) holds, then O(E) contains any node
from which alternation never causes the stocks to differ by more than n', without regard
to total capacity. So, for e(< , implementability depends only on symmetry. The higher
the interest rate or longer the period length, the less elastic demand must be for this result
to hold. With elastic demand (4.4) implies a trade-off between the aggregate size of cap-
acity and the inequality of its distribution, in determining whether alternation is imple-
mentable. For e>T , ý(n,k)_e only if 6n_> (i.e., n<n') and k is not too large; the
smaller is n, the larger can k be while maintaining V(n,k)>e. Thus, the greater is the
total capacity, the more equally must it be held for alternation to be implementable.
Another implication of Theorem 2 is the Proposition below. Its proof examines the
limit as h-40 of the set h..0 (E), and uses Theorem 1 to extend 0 to a full MPE on S.
This method foreshadows limit arguments developed more fully in section V of the paper.
Proposition 1: For any fixed EE(0,1), r>0, and total capacity R=RA+RB, an MPE exists
which achieves collusion whenever it is relevant, given that the periods are short enough
and the initial holdings are sufficiently symmetric. Formally:
Let R, e, and r be given, and consider the vector of capacities R=(RA,RB), where
RA+RB=R. There exists x>O, i>0, and oES such that {st(so(h,R),c)}cM(a)
whenever h<Fl, IRA-RB <X, and Q*(so(h,R))=1.
Proof: See the appendix.
The proof is based upon the observation that, when the periods are short and the
firms egually placed, private incentives to conform with the alternating profile nearly
coincide with "social" incentives to maximize industry revenues: If each firm has kwR/2h
units, then (4.4) implies that neither firm deviates from 6& if e<( )(+6 2k-1 On the
T+7a)(1$ b ). Onthe
other hand, coordination is required to maximize industry revenues if E<1+62k-1), b
(4.1). But, as h-0 and &1, these condition both require that R < -ln(2f-l)/r. Thus,
the notions of "alternation" and "coordination" are intrinsically linked in this model.
D. MPE Extension of the Alternating Convention -
We now complete the program initiated in Theorem 2 by exhibiting a profile which
is a perfect equilibrium extension of & to the entire lattice. The extension profile takes
the following general form on S\ .(E): The larger firm supplies one unit at every node,
while the smaller firm supplies nothing if and only if, by so doing, the equilibrium path
reaches O.(e) within a given number of periods. The critical number of periods depends
only on the smaller firm's endowment. The argument is based on a backward induction in
two dimensions, as suggested by the disculssion of section III. We require the following:
Definition 4.3: For strictly positive sES, and 0<E<1, the "waiting time" m(s) is given by:
(4.5) m(s) = min{mEIIVk, 1k<.k(s): 4(n(s)+l-m,k)2e}, if 4(1,k(s))Že, and
m(s) = +w, if ý(1,k(s))<e.
Theorem 3: With any arbitrary sequence {mk:k>l}CI associate the profile aoE which
extends & as follows: On Y(f), o(s)=&(s). On S\. O(E), oj()(s)()l; ai(s)(s)=0 if
l<m(s)<mk(s)
, otherwise cri(s)(s)=l. For each EE(0,1) there exists a unique sequence
{mk:k>l} such that the associated profile o*, determined in this way, is an MPE.
Proof: See the appendix.
Comparing (4.4) and (4.5), in light of Corollary 2, one may see that m(s) is the
time that the smaller firm [i(s)] would have to wait before reaching .0(e) if it does not
produce, given that the larger firm [j(s)] supplies constantly. With every sequence {mk}
we have associated this strategy for i on S\ .(E): "Wait for .(E) when holding k units
if and only if you can get there within mk periods; otherwise, produce." So {mk} may
be interpreted as the parameters of an "optimal waiting policy" for i, given the assumed
behavior of j. The Theorem asserts that, given alternation on O.(c), this "optimal wait-
ing" by i together with constant production by j on S\.~(c) are mutual best responses.
This waiting strategy extends the set of nodes at which simultaneous production is
avoided (and thus collusion is achieved) 1.eyond the region of alternation, O(c), by giving
precedence (and therefore, enhanced payoff) to the firm with greater capacity. An interest-
ing interpretation of the MPE a* is that the larger firm exploits its position so as to
garner a greater than proportionate share of the collusive profits by credibly threatening to
"produce all the time" on S. .(), thereby persuading the smaller firm that it is in its
interest to forebear, wh,:.e'er m(s)•mk(s). To see the basis of this outcome consider a
node s such that k(s)=1, and n(s)=n>,•-1. We noted above that cj(s)(S)=1, VoaEE, at
such a node. Thus j has the dominant play (or, credible threat) of "1" at s; i knows
this, and will wait as long as it can have the market to itself within n' periods. This
reasoning, applied recursively, generates the full sequence of optimal waiting times, {m3}.
When demand is inelastic in the sense of (4.3) these waiting times can be explicitly
found. We give the derivation in the text to illustrate the conceptual basis of Theorem 3.
Corollary 3: If <-1+ then the sequence {m*}, k>1, determining a* is given by:
(4.6) m = Max {mEI I m (T ).(1+ 62 k-1)kE}, kEl.
Proof: We use a nested induction to construct i's best response to {af=1} on S\ .(E). If
sES\ .(E) and k(s)=1, then it is obvious that i(s) either produces at s, earning Pe, or
waits for .(e) , earning 
~6m(s). So i waits if and only if m(s)•n'-l=m*, since, by the
proof of Corollary 2, firm j produces under & at the first point reached in O.(E).
Inductively, assume that following or. is optimal for i(s) whenever k(s)<k-1, for
{m, ...,ml-} as given in (4.6), k>2, and consider i's best play from sES\.O(c) where
k(s)=k. The proof rests on the fact that m(s)<mk implies m(s-(1,1))<mk_1 when e< :
k k_1 1+- -o
Corollary 2 implies that m(s)=n(s)-N, for NE(n',n'-1}, and one easily verifies from (4.6)
that mkE{mk-_1, m* -1}, k>2, so m(s-(1,1))=m(s)m*•km-_ 1. Hence, if firm i plays
"1" at s, continuing optimally from s-(1,1), it earns: f3.[e+6m(s)+2.(1-6 2k-2)/(1- 62).
If it waits for .(f) it earns: 6m(s)+1. (1-62k)/(1-_2). Simple algebra shows waiting is
better. Therefore, by induction, at is optimal from all s such that lm(s)(m*I k(s)*
On the other hand, if k(s)=k and m(s)=mt+1, the same algebra now shows i(s)
does better to play "1" at s. Suppose this is true when k(s)=k and mk<m(s)•m"+m-1,
m>2, and consider the best play for i(s) when k(s)=k and m(s)=mk+m. If it plays "1"
at s and then "0" at s-(1,1), it arrives at some node (say s') after two periods, having
earned 0e. If, alternatively, i plays "0" at s and then "1" at the successor node, it also
arrives at s' after two periods, but now Aaving earned only 6~0 along the way. Clearly
the former course dominates the latter. The induction hypothesis on k implies i will do
no worse than the former course if it plays "1" at s, while the induction hypothesis on m
implies i can do no better than the latter course if it plays "0". Therefore, induction on
m, for fixed k, followed by induction on k, establishes that at is optimal for i at any s
for which m(s)>mk(s) , completing the proof. o
Finally, we note that the MPE a* obeys a kind of "inverse entropy" law: The
market never evolves toward less coordinated play as capacities decline. For sES\ .0(),
coordination is achieved at s if and only if m(s)•mk(s) , in which case the ensuing path
leads directly to 2(c), with firm i forebearing until this region is reached, and alternating
play thereafter. If m(s-t. (1,1))>mk( s)_+, 0<t<k(s)-1, then both firms produce until i
has exhausted its capacity. If m(s)>mk( s) but m(s-t -(1,1))=mk(s)_t , lt<~k(s)-l, the
equilibrium path begins with both producing, but i withdraws at the node s-t.(1,1) and
waits for 9(E). So o* satisfies: sEM(?) and Q*(s)=l only if {st(s,a*)}CM(c-). That
is, if coordination is achieved at any node, it is achieved at every subsequent node.
E. The Limits to Collusion in Perfect Equilibrium
We complete this discussion of tacit collusion by showing that it is possible to
achieve the industry's revenue maximum in an MPE from a considerably larger set of
nodes than M(o*) when demand is inelastic. At the same time, our constructive methods
show why collusion is not possible in any equilibrium when capacities are very unequally
distributed. For the rest of this section we assume that f< b . Denote by M* the set of
nodes sES from which there exists some MPE oEE satisfying: {st(s,a)}CM(o).
Any collusive path {st(s,a)} occasionally passes between the firms' "regions of pre-
cedence", so that a date t is reached when o(st)+o(st+l)=(1,1). From Corollary 1 we
know that V (a)(st)(60( ) where j is the firm for which aj(st)=0. If the difference in
holdings is great at s there will be no path which maximizes industry revenue and keeps
the larger firm's payoff below this bound. But this means that the larger firm would not
have been willing to forebear in order tc arrive at s in any revenue maximizing MPE. So
any such path arriving at s must have hegun with the smaller firm waiting. There is a
limit on how long a firm would be willing to wait, which may be determined by an induc-
tive argument similar to that used in the proof of Theorem 3. A limit is ascertainable in
this way on the degree of disparity in initial holdings consistent with an MPE generating a
collusive path. We can then use Theorems 1 and 2, and the notion of alternation, to con-
struct an MPE generating a collusive path from any node within these limits.
Ignoring Markov strategies momentarily, let us study those time paths of output
which avoid simultaneous production everywhere without either firm's implied payoff be-
coming "too large". Call the path {qt:Ot<t} admissible from s if (1) qtE{(0,1),(1,0)},
Vt; (2) q +q1l...+q = s; and (3) the value of the sequence {qt,:t<t'<tf}, for either firm
and any intermediate date t, 0<t<t, does not exceed 3(-). Consider the recursion:
(i) fl = n', and fik= nk-1+ck-1, kel, where for k=1, 2, ... ,
(4.7) (ii) ck Max{cII (-) 6 • ( )}, and
(iii) Vk k) + Vk-1, with Vo =•( .)
Then we have:
Lemma 3: An admissible path from s exists iff n(s)_ilk(s) , where {lk}' klI, solves (4.7).
Moreover, for kET, c f iik-lk-1+1 < +1, where _-Max{cEII C(1-6)/( 1-. +1)>•}_1.
Proof: Consider the problem of finding the longest possible sequence of "l's" and "O's",
given that exactly k "O's" are to be used in the sequence, such that no "tail" of the
sequence ever has a present value exceeding #(~-.), where a "1" earns the value P, a "0"
earns nothing, and the discount factor is 6. Let fik+k be the maximal number of "l's" in
this sequence, klI. With {i0k} so defined, it is obvious that an admissible path exists from
s if and only if n(s)_fik(s). The recursion (4.7) is the Bellman equation for this optimiza-
tion problem: ck is the number of "l's" which may be added to the sequence as the num-
ber of allowable "O's" increases from k-1 to k. So, ck=(k+iik)-(k-l+ik-1_)
, which is (i).
Vk is the present value of a sequence at its maximal length, given k. So (ii) and (iii)
follow from the Principle of Optimality and the definition of present value.
From (ii) and (iii): 1( )<Vk<•(-), keI. Substitution into (ii) yields:
(4.8) c Max{ceII 6c(1-6)/(1- 6c+1),} < ck < Min{cEII 6 ~(l~f)(1-6/(1-)<} , kl.
Since T _Ec, 0c1; while the definitions above imply E•<c+2, and hence <•ck<c+l. More-
over, if B(1-6)/(1--+1)? +1(1-6)/(1--+1), then ck=c , Vk>l1. o
Define N={sES k(s)=0 or n(s)>iik(s)-ck(s)}, where {fik} and {ck}, k>1, are as
given in (4.7). Notice that if n(s)>fik(s)-ck(s) then, by Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, no col
lusive MPE path is possible in which the smaller firm produces at s. Thus, any MPE path
from sEN attaining an industry revenue maximum involves firm i(s) waiting at least
n(s)-[ik(s)-Ck(s) ] periods before producing. Once it has produced on a collusive MPE
path at some node s'EN for which n(' )=fik(s ')-k(s'), the ensuing path, necessarily
admissible, must follow the pattern of production implied by (4.7): ck t units supplied by
the larger firm, followed by one unit frora the smaller firm, for 1•<tk-1. Thus, although
admissibility is an "open-loop" concept, it provides a powerful tool for assessing the limits
to collusion in MPE. For in the Appendix we prove that if an admissible path exists from
sES, or if i(s) would wait from s to reach the only admissible path in N, then sEM*.
Theorem 4: Given any sequence {mk:kl}CI define the profile & on N as follows:
(a) If n(s)=fik(s)--k(s) then iij( )=0 and i(s)=1;
(b) If k(s)=O, or mk(s)+fik(s)>n(s)>fik(s)-Ck(s)
, then 3j(s)= 1 and &i(s)=0;
(c) If n(s)>fik(s)+mk(s) then ~7(s)=(1,1).
Then: (i) 3 {nk:k>l} for which rE1,N; moreover, (ii) {sESI n(s)<fik(s)+mk(s)}cM*.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The kinship of Theorems 3 and 4 should be apparent. Theorem 3 constructs the
MPE a* from the restricted equilibrium & on .(e)CS, showing that constant supply by
the larger firm, and optimal waiting by the smaller one, are mutual best responses on
S\ (E). Theorem 4 constructs the restricted MPE & on N by specifying behavior on
the "boundary" of N to coincide with the unique admissible path in that set, and then
showing that constant supply by j together with optimal waiting by i are mutual best
responses, given this specified boundary behavior. Since & is a restricted MPE on N,
there exists some uES such that U=- on ". The second part of Theorem 4 is based on
the fact that, for any sON, we can choose -o so that the path {st(s,-)} implies alter-
nating play on S\N, and hence {st(s,-)}cM(F). We conjecture, but have as yet not proven,
that & completely characterizes M* in the sense that if n(s)>fik(s)+mk(s) , then soM*.
Theorem 4(ii) states that the existence of an admissible path from a given node im-
plies some MPE attains an industry revenues maximum from that node. So Lemmas 2 and
3 together show clearly why coordination via non-cooperative play is more difficult to
achieve when firms precommit to paths of actions than when they use state-contingent
rules, in this dynamic duopoly with indivisible production. With open-loop strategies, the
possibility of coordination turns on the ability to find a path for which the discounted value
of the high price on each firm's last supply date is no less than the discounted value of the
low price on his first date of forebearance. With Markov play what matters is whether the
right to produce can be allocated so that neither firm has to wait when the value of contin-
uing, on a prorated per period basis, exceeds the fall in price induced by a loss of coor-
dination. Comparing (4.2) and (4.7) reveals that the former is the more severe constraint.
Theorem 4 suggests that the concepts of "alternation", "forebearance", and "optim-
al waiting" are sufficient to fully describe how the firms might tacitly coordinate their
actions in this setting. As the proof of the Theorem reveals, the extreme admissible path
implied by (4.7) constitutes a "boundary" separating the "interior" of N from the rest of
S. From any sES\N the firms agree to alternate until reaching this boundary; from any
sEN not on the boundary, the smaller firm waits for the boundary if it is in its interest to
do so. Play along the boundary gives the larger firm sole access to the market roughly the
fraction 1-e of the time [see (4.8)]. This tacit agreement is self-enforcing, because each
firm knows it to be in the other's interest to conform from any node in the state space.
V. Depicting Discrete Equilibrium Dynamics in a Continuous State Space
Consider a continuous formulation of this game, without the assumption that out-
put rates are fixed for intervals of length h. The state space is all capacity pairs, .R 2
Each firm's (Markov) strategy maps capacities into production rates: li:R2-1{0,1}, i=A,B.
The profile ~l=(qA',•B) partitions the state space into regions of production, q• (1), and
forebearance, lil(0), for each firm, and induces a vector field determining the evolution of
the system over time: =-4-(R ), Ro g:ven. For R=(RA,RB), the associated phase dia-
-1. --11 --- 1gram shows motion "due South" on qA 1O)nB (1), "due West" on q (1)nqB (0), and
--1 ~--1
"Southwest" on qA1(1)nq-B(1). Payoffi from any node are given in the obvious way, as
the discounted integral of instantaneous ievenue flows. An equilibrium consists of a stra-
tegy pair from which neither firm can affect a unilateral improvement in its payoff from
any node, where strategies are restricted so that the differential equation describing the
evolution of the system always has a solution. Any such restriction will imply that the sets
:i1(1) have a relatively simple topological structure.
Now, let {ah:h>0} be a family of .IPE of the discrete game, indexed by the period
length h. For h fixed, ah will cause the vector of capacities, RT, to evolve over time in
the following manner: Given Ro, a uniqc:e initital state so(h,Ro)Ph-1 Ro is determined,
as is the path {st(so(h,Ro),ah)}. So,
RT+h-R = -h ah (st(so(t,Ro),ah))= -h- h(so(h,R7)), VT=h.t, tEI.
By analogy with the continuous case, {h :h>0} defines a vector field on R+2 given by:
-= --i(R ) -lim {h (o(h,R7))},
h-40
if the limit exists. The implied phase diagram, showing the motion over time of (RT: 7T0),
would mimic closely the path of capacities and the payoffs generated by ah , for "small" h.
The MPE o* defined in Theorem 3 treats h parametrically, so it actually defines
a family of MPE, {fh:h>0}, as envisioned above. But *h is an extension of Sh, the
alternating profile, and { h(s (h,R))} has no limit, as h-.0: Alternation leads to "chat-
tering" for infinitesmal h. The continuouis approach outlined above could not produce
behavior in equilibrium like that which emerges in the equilibria we have studied for the
discrete game, with h "small". This is nc,t necessarily a criticism of the discrete approach;
one might as readily conclude that the continuous formulation is flawed, to the extent that
it fails to capture the strategic possibilities inherent in a convention of "turn-taking".
Moreover, this "chattering" in the limit need not prevent a phase diagrammatic depiction
of equilibrium dynamics; we can simply dcfine: ( ½,) 1 lim h (So(h,R))}, as h-.0, VREIR 2
With this definition in mind, note that the equilibrium a* defined in Theorem 3
partitions the state space S into three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
regions: a region of alternation, .0; a region of forebearance by the smaller firm, 5; and a
region of simultaneous production, ed. Drop the explicit dependence of .0 on e. Clearly,
=f={seS 0<m(s)<mmk( s)} and oYf{sES m(s)>mk(s)}. The dynamics generated by a*, for
dR 11 dR
"small" h, satisfy: , if s(hR) as h; =-1,1), if so(h,R)E QY as h-40;
dR
and, a=-(o0) [-(0,1)], if so(h,R)E 5 as h-40, for j(so(h,R))=A [B]. The results in
Section IV (and their proofs) can be used to solve for the regions of R 2 in which these
various motions obtain, even when explicit formulae cannot be found in the discrete case.
Abusing notation, write RE . [3, oY] if 3•>O such that, Vh<', so(h,R)E . [5, of].
Denote x-I RA-RB I, y-Min{RA,RB} and z=Max{RA,RB}; then h-.0*h.n(so(h,R))-+x and
h.k(so(h,R))-4y. Define w(x,y)-lim{h-mn(s°(h,R))}, and w*(y) = lim {h.m(s (h,)).
h-4 0 h-+O k(so(h1R))}'
Proposition 2: The limiting dynamics implied by the MPE (family) a* on the continuous
2state space R_ = (.U JU of) are as described above, where:
REY if eX. e-2 ry' + .((1e-2ry' ) > f, Vy'E[0,y];
RE 5 if 0 < w(x,y) < w*(y); and, RE oY if w(x,y) > w*(y).
Moreover, w(x,y) = x + lln(E), E<'; w(x,y) = x + -In + (e ' )e2 ry], e> ; and:
(5.1) w*(y) = 1.1n[(1+e- 2ry)/2f], (< ;
(5.2) w*(y) = Max{0, 1-ln1 u(y)+ 22u (y 2ryr L 2
for u(y) I1 - 2e- 1)e2ry] 0<yy---In(2E-1)/2r. When e> , w*(y)=0, ^,ysy, for E(0,y-).
L1+(2~-l)e'ryj 
- _
Proof: The argument is a straightforward consequence of taking limits in (4.4), (4.5) and
(4.6), except for the derivation of (5.2), vwhich is in the Appendix. By Corollary 2, Re . if
32>0 such that, Vhf<: ý(n(so(h,R))+:,k)>e, VkEI, k<k(so(h,R)). Then (4.4) implies:
ý[n(so(h,R))+1, k(so(h,R))] - e-rx .e-2ry + ½.(1- 2ry), as h -+ 0.
Moreover, from (4.5) one sees that m(so(h,R)) must "solve": 4(n-m+1,k)=E. Equating
the limit above with e, substituting (x-w) for x, and solving for w, gives w(x,y). Let-
-• ,•2k -1 1 -rw*
ting h-•0 in (4.6) gives: e P Sm( )(1+ 62k-1) - w*(l+e-2 ry), as h-40, which is
(5.1). The derivation of (5.2) is more complex since no explicit representation of {mk} is
available when e>T 7; equation (A.2) ia the proof of Theorem 3 must be utilized. o
It follows from (5.1) that, when c<-, a coordination failure occurs under the MPE
1 IerY+e-rY_o* for "small" h if z = x+y > r In[ 2 -ry . The comparable limit in (4.2) implies
that a coordination failure must occur ;n any open-loop equilibrium if z > r. ln[e
This gives a clear measure of the superiority of closed-loop play for achieving coordination.
A comparable measure can be derived from (5.2), which shows that the advantage of state-
contingent play vanishes as e-41. Observe that the expressions in (5.1) and (5.2) converge
as c-41/2, so equilibrium behavior is continuous in the elasticity of demand. It is easy to
compute firms' payoffs for various endowment configurations using the results of Proposi-
tion 2, and so to verify our assertion that the larger firm garners a greater than propor-
tionate share of industry earnings from nodes RE 5 where w(x,y)=w*(y). Figures 4A and
4B depict the limit phase diagrams for the MPE a* in the respective cases c<1 and c> 1
The power of this limit argument is made clear by its application to the restricted
MPE & defined in Theorem 4. For there the discrete game is very difficult to analyze,
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but its continuous analogue is transparent. Lemma 3, and equations (4.7) and (4.8), can be
employed to see that s (h,R)EN, for h sufficiently small, if z>-ln(e)/r + ( )y. The
extreme admissible path defining the boundary of N "chatters" with infinitesmal h, since
(by (4,8)) ckE{g, c+l}, where _c=Max{cell c<~ }. But as h-+O this boundary becomes a
line with slope (relative to the larger firm's axis) I, along which the larger firm produces
on average the fraction 1-e of the time. (See Figure 4C.) The proof of Theorem 4 shows
that one can extend U in such a way that, "above" this line, the firms agree to take
alternate turns. The profile & requires that "below" this line the larger firms produces
constantly and the smaller firm waits optimally. Optimal waiting is equivalent to the effi-
cient use of an option to go to the boundary of N, taking the payoff implied by & there.
Let us see how the limit of the waiting times, w(y)-l ihm{h.mk(so(h,R))}, and hence
the behavior implied by &, may be derived. From equation (A.3) in the Appendix one can
verify that the problem facing the smaller firm at any nude s for which n(s)>iik(s) is to
decide how long to earn Pe by producing each period, before waiting to move to the ex-
treme admissible path where the firm can earn 3 each time it produces, but only gets to
produce the fraction c of the time. (Because of discounting, earning P for duration c,
and nothing for duration 1-E is better than earning Pe continuously, so waiting might
pay.) For each unit of time that the firm produces, the wait increases by roughly
units of time, since the boundary of N has slope while the path along which both
firms produce has slope 1. Passing to the limit, if the smaller firm has y units of stock, if
the wait for the boundary of N is initially w, and if the firm produces for t units of time
before beginning to wait, then its earnings are:
(5.3) JI(y,t,w) = !f{[l -rt] + er(t-w)[e-rt/E-e-rY/e]}, y>O, w>0, and 0<t<y.
Accordingly:
(5.4) w(y) = Max {w>O I l(y,O,w) _ Max II(y,t,w)}.
O < t<y
One may verify from (5.3) that 0'HI/ovwat>0, so that II(y,0,w)>H(y,t,w), VtE[0,y],
if and only if w<_(y). Notice as well that 11 is not generally a concave function of t.
This fact has the implication that the equilibrium path under a may not be continuous in
the initial conditions, since the argmax in (5.4) need not be a continuous function of w and
y. [E.g, this continuity is crucial to the derivation of (5.2).] Thus, it may be desirable for
the smaller firm to wait to reach the boundary of IN from some node, and yet a slight de-
crease in endowment would cause its strategy to switch to producing for a protracted per-
iod. A number of interesting results along these lines can be derived with remarkable ease
from (5.3) and (5.4), as exemplified by t tl following:
Proposition 3: Assume e<1/3. Then W(y) in[ 1-e-r . Some MPE extension of
1-_ery . Some MPE extension of •
attains the high price continuously if z < -ln(c)/r + (1-e)y/e + w(y), for h sufficiently
small. If the inequality is reversed, then the low price obtains at every date until the
smaller firm has exhausted, under any MPE extension of &, when h is small enough.
Proof: Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, (5.3) implies:
r1t(y,t,w) = ert -er(t - w) [(L-)e -rtI + e-rY/ ]; while,
r- I2 (y,t,w) = -ert + et-w). [( )2 e - e rt/ _
tt
T1 -2 r(t-w) ,,1-., 1-2 c-rt/ rThus: [r t+r2  t] = e t- [( )(- )e-rt/ - 2e-ry/ ] 0, 0<t<y, Vw>0, since
CE1/3. So 1Ht<0 1 tt>0, and 1Htt <0 * Rt>0. In particular, the function lI(y,t,w) never
attains an interior maximum with respect to t on the interval [0,y]. Thus, since 1-tw>0,
for any y>0 there exists w(y) such that II(y,0,w)'>F(y,y,w) iff yw. o
VI. Conclusion
In the model of dynamic duopoly studied here firms regulate an "on-off" production
process, depleting their respective supplies of an non-replenishable factor of production at
a constant rate whenever their process is "on". When both are producing the price is low.
If only one of them produces an any moment the price is high. Each of them knows, at any
moment, the remaining capacity to produce of the other. Two notions of equilibrium are
investigated. In open-loop Nash Equilibrium the firms commit at the initial date to time
paths of production which are mutual best responses. In Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the
firms specify state-contingent plans of actions which are mutual best responses in every
contingency. The capacity of the firms, in these alternative strategic settings, to achieve
coordination of their actions via non-cooperative play has been systematically investigated.
By assuming firms can change their actions only on exogenously given, equally
spaced moments in time, we convert the problem to a discrete time game which, due to the
dichotomous production structure, can be explicitly solved. The possibility for coordin-
ation to be attained via non--cooperative play, in either strategic setting, is characterized
(in Lemmas 2 and 3) by two relatively simple integer programming problems. These
characterizations allow us to derive the r.ain comparative results of the paper: that the
ability to precommit undermines the possibility of coordination; and that state-contingent
strategies are more effective at coordinating play when firms are symmetrically placed.
The analysis emphasizes a difference between discrete and continuous time dynamic
games recently stressed by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989). The extensive form analyzed in
the discrete game, though restricted to Markov strategies, reveals a rich structure largely
hidden from view in a continuous time treatment. The idea of "precedence" - firms' mak-
ing their play contingent on "who did what last period" - is fundamental to achieving max-
imal coordination in this environment. Of course, this finding is related to the "on-off'
process of production which has been assumed here, but the point would seem to be of more
general import. The results in section V on the limit behavior of our Markov Equilibria
suggest the possibility of profitably using this discrete approach in other settings where
continuous time formulations have been reflexively adopted.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Define S k {(a,b)ES a+b<k}, kET. The sets {S k- are nested, cover S, and are
closed to deviations from any profile aEE. Therefore l Sk+ 1CE k, 2k>1, and hence
SIsk:k>l}. Now, clearly, SI=-E. For fixed k>l, for any uEsk, and for every
se(Sk+ l \Sk), one of the alternatives (3.2)(a)-(c) holds at s. Moreover, for such k and s,
the continuation payoffs in (3.2)(a)-{c) do not depend on values taken by a on S\S k
Therefore, given WCS and rEE IW, the following inductive procedure constructing
the profile o*EE is well defined. For svccessive values of k=1, 2, ...: (1) At each node
sE(Sk+1\Sk)nW, set ?*(s)=Er(s). (2) At each seSk+1\(skuw), assign a value to a* con-
sistent with the Bellman Inequalities there. Now [rE.W implies EE Sk nW' k>1. Thus
Lemma 1 implies that -*EE; Sk, at each step k. Therefore t*EE. 0
Proof of Corollary 2:
Let seS be strictly positive, with n=n(s), k=k(s), i=i(s) and j=j(s). By the
definition of the alternating profile we have that:
(i) V ()(s) = 6 /. [(1-62k-2)/(1-62) 4- 2 k-2.(1-i6 n+l)/(1-)] if a.(s)=O; and,
(ii) Vi(&)(s) = 6f(1-6 2k)/(1-6 2 ), if ai(s)=0.
Now, by Definition 4 1, sE ._(c) if, for every s' a strictly positive successor of s under
^, Vj(&)(s')ý_( ) when a&(s')=O, and Vi(&)(s')b6(Q1-) when _i(s')=O. Notice that
the RHS of (i) exceeds the RHS of (ii), for any n0O, k>1. Therefore, when a&(s)=O then
se .(e) if: (1) [RHS (i)]•6(-) for 1<k<k(s) and n=n(s); and, (2) [RHS (ii)]630( ) for
l<k<k(s)-1. When &~(s)=O then se O(e) if: (1) [RHS (i)]•L6( ), for l<k<k(s) and
n=n(s)-1; and, (2) [RHS (ii)]i(-~-6 ) for l<kk(s). Condition (2) is redundant in each
case if n>1. Given (4.4), condition (1) is equivalent to: 4(n(s),k)Že, lIk<k(s), if &i(s)=0;
and, ý(n(s)+1,k)Že, l<k<k(s), if & (s)=0. But if (4.3) holds then 4(n,k)>e, V k>1, if and
only if n<n'. This completes the proof. o
Proof of Proposition 1:
Suppose c<1/2. Let R=(RA,RB) be some vector of initial stocks such that
RA+RB=R. Given any h>O, Corollary 2 implies so(h,R)E 9.(E), VR>O, if:
(i) IRA-RE I < -In()/r, and
(ii) h <
Condition (i) assures that n(so(h))_n'(h)--1 (neglecting rounding error, which vanishes for
small h), while condition (ii) gaurantees that (4.3) holds. Theorems 1 and 2 together
imply there exists an MPE profile ao coinciding with & on 9(f). Since soe 0. (c), from
the definition of or, we conclude that {st(so,a)}CM(a).
Suppose Qe1/2, and continue to denote by o an MPE satisfying aor= on 2(c).
Let R=(RA,RB), with RA+RB=R, and define IRA-RB i-x, Min{RA,RB}=y. Fix h>O
and let s=so(h,R). It follnws from (4.4) that sE .(e) when &j(s)(s)=O if and only if:
(A.1) 6(h)2k(s)-1 > e- r1+6(h) 1 - 6(h)
6(h)n( S )[1+6(h)] - 1
Take the limit in (A.1) as h-0O, using the definitions of s, n(.), and k(.), to see that
so(h,R)E -. (f) for h sufficiently small if:
(iii) e- 2 ry > (2e-1)/(2e-rX-1).
As long as:
(iv) < -ln(2E-1)/r,
it will be possible to select x>O and y>O such that x+2y=R, and (iii) holds. Now, by
the analysis leading to (4.1) we know that Q*(so)=l iff: n(s)Žn(s)+2k(s)KR. But (4.1)
implies h.n(so(h,R)) - -ln(2E-1)/r, as h-+0. Thus (iv) is satisfied whenever R is below
the threshold at which collusion becomes desirable. For such R it is always possible to
divide the total endowment such that (iii) holds. Thus, for h is small enough we can find
R=(RA,RB), RA+RB=W, such that {st(so(h,R),a)}cM(a) whenever Q*(so(h,R))=l. o
Proof of Theorem 3:
We have to show that the profile o* is well defined, and that neither firm will
deviate from it at any node sES\ .O(e). This amounts to showing two things: (1) that
there exists a unique sequence of integers {mk} such that on S\ -•(e) the strategy "wait for
.O(e) from s if you can get there within mk(s) periods" is a best response for i(s) to the
strategy "always produce" for j(s); and, (2) the strategy "always produce" is a best
response for j(s) to the strategy given in (1) for i(s). The proof of Corollary 3 establishes(1) in the case <•6/(1+6), when an explicit formula for {mk} can be found. The nested
induction employed there may be extended to the general case ~E(0,1) as follows.
Consider S(k)={seS\.()l|k(s)•k}, k>l. Given any integers {ml, ..., mk}, the
profile defined in the Theorem, and thus each firm's value function, is uniquely determined
at every node in S(k). Therefore, the following induction uniquely defines a sequence of
integers {mk}, k>l, and so, by the definition in the Theorem, a profile a*:
(A.2) m* -n'-1; and for k>2,
mk -Max {m(s)} s.t. k(s)=k, and 6 m(s)1 [l k] E+bV
s ES 1_62 1(s)
where mk-0 if the inequality always fails. This definition is meaningful because at each
k>2 the profile o* and values Vi(o)(-), i=A,B, are already defined on S(k-1)U.(E);
and, k(s)=k implies s-(1,1)ES(k-1)U.~(E). The integers mk are defined by the require-
ment that waiting to reach an alternating path is dominated for i(s) by producing when-
ever m(s)>mk. What we have to show is that waiting for one period at s is optimal for
i(s) if and only if m(s)<mk, VsES\ .O(E). For this we use the following nested induction.
Suppose: (a) i(s) will not deviate from a* on S(k-1), k>2; and, (b) the inequality
in (A.2) fails at s, where k(s)=k and m(s)=m>l1. Then that inequality also fails at s',
where k(s')=k and m(s')=m+1. By (b), waiting to reach 9.0(c) from s' is worse for i(s)
than waiting for one period, producing for one period, and then following a*. While, by(a), producing for one period and then following 0* is at least as good as producing for
one period, waiting for one period, and then following 0*. Thus, producing and then fol-
lowing o* dominates waiting to reach ~(E) from s'. So either, for all sES(k) with
k(s)=k, producing for one period and then following a* is better than waiting to reach
.O(e), whence mkiO; or, for some mk>0, the inequality in (A.2) holds iff m(s)<mk. For
fixed k, this induction on m implies i(s) follows 0* on S(k) if it does so on S(k-1),
k>2. The induction on k, and the fact that i(s) follows a* on S(1), then imply that the
"optimal waiting strategy" defined in (A.2) is firm i's best response on all of S.
We now show that the larger firm will not deviate from constant production on
S(k), k>1, given that the smaller firm follows a*. We do so by induction on k. Clearly
js) will not deviate from 0* at any node where i(s) is waiting, so we need only consider
s for which m(s)>mk(s). We argued in the text that j(s) follows a* on S(1). Assume
this is so on S(k-1), k>2. Take any sES(k) such that k(s)=k and m(s)>mk. Let s' be
the node reached if j(s) follows a*, let s'" be the node reached if j(s) deviates from a*,
and let m-m(s'). There are three cases: (1) m>m_1; (2) m<mk-l; and (3) m=mk .
Case (1): By the definitions, m(s'')=m+1. So in this case i(s) will be playing "1"
at the successor to node s, whether j(s) follows o* or not. But then j(s) cannot gain
by deviating. For, given discounting, firm j does better to follow a* at s and then
deviate at s', than to deviate at s and then follow 0* at s' ', since both paths termin-
ate after two periods at the same node. Yet, by the induction hypothesis, the payoff from
the former course is a lower bound on the value of following o* at s, and the payoff to the
latter course is the best that can happen if firm j deviates at s.
Case (2): In this case i(s) will be waiting to reach .(E) from the successor to s,
whether j(s) follows o* or not. So j(s) does better under a* from s'' than it would
do under the pure alternating profile. Moreover, since s% .(c), it follows that:
j(s)o, were (s)to play " ( *) (s, its Vj(s)alue there would exceed )(s1-).)/(-) But then theSo, were j(s) to play "0" at s, its value there would exceed 6(1-e)/(1-6). But then the
reasoning of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 implies firm j will not wait to "take its turn"
under such circumstances. Hence, j follows a* at s.
Case (3): In this case if j(s) follows a* it goes to the node s' where i(s) begins
waiting to reach .(e0), while by deviating it goes to s"' where i(s) is not waiting. We
know from Case (2) that if i(s) were to begin waiting at s" then it would not pay for
firm j to deviate at s. Thus, we can dispose of this case if we can show that firm j is
worse off at s'" when firm i produces there than when firm i begins waiting there. Let
t' denote the first date at which firm i(h,) waits along the path {st(s ",a4)}, 0It'_k-1.
If t'=0, we are in Case (2). A critical fact for this proof is the following:
m(st,(s" ,a*)) 5 m(s"), l<t'<k-1.
The waiting time to reach .(c) does not rise as one moves along the path {st(s' ',a*)}.
To see this notice that, by Corollary 2, m(s)=Min{mEIlVk, l<kfk(s), ý(n(s)-m+l,k)>c}.
The discussion following Corollary 2 in the text implies that, as k(s) falls, the critical value
of n for which ((n,k)Že, l<k<k(s), does riot decline. But n(st,(s ,a*))=n(s' '), and
k(st,(s' ',a*))<k(s- ')=k-1, by the defini-;ions. Thus, m(st,(s' ',,*))•m(s'').
With this observation in hand, we .complete the proof by showing that firm j is
worse off under a* at s"' if firm i produces there, than if it does not. Given that firm i
is about to begin waiting for O.(e), it is obviously better for firm j if the wait is longer.
Define V*(t)-Vj(s)(L*)(s"), given that ;'=t; let st st(s',a), and mt-m(st). We need
to show that V*(0)>V*(t), 1ltsk-1. From the definition of the profile L* we have:
V*(t) = e( ) + 1+mt +t+mt ) .Vj(s)()(t), O<t<k-1,
where stE O(c) is the first node reached at which firm j waits. Since a longer wait by i
favors j, and since mt+lmt, we know that V*(t+l) is no greater than the value implied
above when mt+i=mt is assumed. But mt+l=mt implies it+l= t-(1,1). Therefore:
4l+mt +mt1-b 1- 1t  1t+l-
V*(t)-V*(t+l) Ž pOe{( 1)-(1 )) + + 1- 6t'l +m
l+t+m
+ 6 {Vj(s)(•O)(t)-bVj(s)(c)(St--(1,1))}, 0<t<k-1.
Now because t~E .(c), and j is waiting at st, we have: Vj(i)(t) s +bsVj(&)(§t--(1,1)).
Substituting this inequality into the exprs;sion above yields the following:
V*(t)-V*(t+1) + (1-e)(1- + m t) > 0, 0<t<k-1.
So V*(O)>V*(t), 1<t(k-1. We conclude that j will not deviate from a* in Case (3). o
Proof of Theorem 4:
(i) We begin by noting that N is closed to deviation from ~r, in view of the fact that
ik>k-1, k>l1. Thus we must show that neither firm can gain by deviating at any node
sEN. Neither will deviate when it alone produces. The proof of Theorem 2 implies j(s)
will not deviate from waiting at nodes sEN for which n(s)=fik(s)-ck(s) , since its payoff at
the successor node under & does not exceed 6I(-c). So what must be shown is that, for
some {mk}, i(s) will not deviate when Oi(s)(s)=0, and neither firm will deviate when
&(s)=(1,1). The structure of the argument is similar to that used for Theorem 3.
Consider first firm i(s). We assert the existence of some sequence of integers
{mk}cI, yet to be determined, such that "&i(s)(S)=O iff fik(s)--ck(s)<n(s)<kik(s)+k(s)
is a best response to "& (S)(s)=l iff fik(s)-ck(s)<n(s) ," EN. Let N~k={sEjIk(s)k}, kET.
A nested induction of the sort used in the proof of Theorem 3 establishes that the optimal
behavior of firm i must be of the "optimal waiting" form: I.e., if for some sENk\Nk- 1
with ik--ck<n(s) it is optimal for i to produce, then it is also optimal for i to produce
at s'ENk\Nk-1 for which n(s')>n(s). The argument turns on the fact that, due to dis-
counting, it could never pay i to wait in order to reach a node at which i will produce,
when it could produce and reach a node from which it might choose to wait. So we need to
show that the length of i's optimal wait on Nk \k-1 is at least ck . This is obviously
true for k=1, since i would wait a total of n' periods to play its one unit, so (consulting
(4.7)) ml=n'--c>0. Suppose, inductively, that {m1, .. i mk- 1}cI, k22, are such that a
gives i's best play on Nk-1, and consider his optimal behavior at sENk\ k- 1 .
Now waiting by i takes it to a node s'k for which n(sl)=fik-ck, after which 3
causes the following pattern of play to ensue: i produces for one period, j produces for
ck- 1 periods, i produces for one period, j produces for ck_ 2 periods, etc. We know
that V (&)(s•)=bVkl, for Vk_1 given in (4.7). Let Tk-2k+ik-ck=n, +k(cl+...+Ckl
be the sum of firms' capacities at sk. Therefore firm i's payoff at sl is given by:
T
(i) Wk - Vi(3)(Sk') = (1-6 k)/( 1-6)- 6Vk-_1
Assuming, inductively, that Vi(3)(s) is well defined on Nk-1, we conclude that waiting
will be optimal at sENk\N k- 1 if and oidy if:
(ii) 6m(s)Wk > /E+&.Vi(7)(-(1,1))= Max {( + m ( s )+ ck -  ...+ c  k- t1 < t<k
where m(s)-n(s)-iik+ck, and Wo=c 0O. The inequality in (ii) states: "i prefers to wait
at s." The equality in (ii) uses the induction hypothesis to infer that, conditional on i
producing at s, i's optimal behavior on Nk-1 takes the form: continue to produce until,
with k-t (possibly zero) units left, it pays to wait for the node s-t, and associated
payoff Wk-t." We need to show that the inequality in (ii) holds when m(s)=ck, so as to
conclude that i waits at sENk\Nk-1 if and only if n(s)ifik+ k, for some EkEI.
In the proof of Lemma 3 we noted that #( )>Vk>( -f ), kn. So by (i):
(iii) [l + - k] > Wk> 1 + 6c-6 k], k2.
Substituting (iii) into (ii) and rearranging, we see that (ii) will hold if, for 1<t<k:
fi Tk  C k,+...+C,.-t T,.
(iv) ck [1-+- k]> (1-) + 6 k+ ...+k-t [1-6+ -- 6 k-t]
Recalling the definition of Tk and using a bit of algebra we have that (ii) holds if:
(v) k (1k-1+...+Ck-t( 1 - Tk+Ck-t] (1 ) 1(t<k-1
(v) 6 (1-b+ 6f)-[1 I9 -4+)> [1 < t <tk-1.
Now by (4.7)(ii), 6 k.[1-6(1-6)Vk-l]2~ and Vkl<( ), k>l; so, k(1-6+6~)2E, k>2.
By Lemma 3, Ck l1 k>l1. Obviously, -< . So, if Ck_+...+ t+, then we
may conclude that [LHS of (v)] > .[1-6'] > [RHS of (v)], and (ii) holds.
Suppose ck-m= 1', 1<mt. Then by (4.8), 62 /(1+6+6 2)<e•6/(1+6), and ck52. Also,
Wk=(1-6 2t)/( 1-, 2)+22tWk-t, and W k t -p(1-b 2(k-t))/(1- 8 ). So (ii) holds if, for
1<t<k:
ck[ -t 1 l6 t(1-6)Wk-t]>2, which holds if 6ck+ 6  ]2  , which holds if T > 7 .
But (4.8) implies that if e>62/(1+6), then ck=1, Vk>l. Since Wk<_l(-), firm i will
wait at least one period to reach an alternating path. Thus we have proven that (ii) holds
for 1<m(s)<ck. The integer mk is given by: mk=Max{m(s) I (ii) holds}-ck>0. We conclude
that i's best play on N is given by &i, fcr {m'k} inductively defined in this manner.
It remains to show that firm j(s) cannot gain by deviating from & at sEI for
which n(s)>fik(s)+mk(s), and 0(s)=(1,1). We sketch the argument here, as the reasoning
closely parallels that employed in this part of the proof of Theorem 3. Again, there are
three cases, distinguished by the behavior of &a at the nodes s' and s' ', respectively
reached if j does or does not follow & at s. If ~ý(s')=(1,1) then j will not deviate, since
that involves waiting to reach a node where it will produce, when it could produce and
reach a node from which it might wait. If i(s" I)=O then j will not deviate, since by the
definition of ilk, the fact that &(s)=(1,1) implies Vj(&)(s) is too large for j to forebear at
s in order to reach s'', where i forebears. There remains the case in which -i(s')=O,
but (s'')=(1,1), so by deviating j avoids reaching a node where i would have begun to
wait. Argument analogous to that used for Theorem 3 disposes of this case as well.
The point, as in the proof of Theorem 3, is that j never gains by delaying i's wait.
Bear in mind that i is waiting to reach the unique admissible path in I at some node s,k
for which n(sk)=ik-Ck. If i were to begin waiting for sI from a node s for which
k(s)=k and n(s)=fik--k+m, then the payoff to j as a consequence of this waiting by i is:
P(1-~6)/(1-6)+6m+lVk-1, for Vk-1 as defined in (4.7). If, however, i were to begin at
s-{1,1), then the implied payoff to j at s is: fe+6((1-- 1 1-)+omVk_1. The
latter payoff is less than the former since, by (4.7), 6mVk1_<fl(H). Thus, if j deviates
from & at s, it would strictly prefer that i begin waiting at s' than at s' '-t-(1,1), for
any tQ1. And yet, it would rather follow 5 at s than deviate and reach s" with i
beginning to wait there. So j will not deviate from & under any contingency, and we may
conclude that & is a restricted MPE on N.
(ii) We now show that {sES In(s)<fik(s)+mk(s)}cM*. Since EEIIN., Theorem 1 implies
that there is some oEE such that -a& on N. By definition of the profile & and the
sequence {mk} we know that {st(s,a-)}cM(-), for all sEN for which n(s)fik(s)+mk(s)
So we will have proven the Theorem if we can show that, for every sES\N, there is some
aEE which generates a collusive path from s. We do so by constructing an extension of
& which has the property that it generates an alternating path from s until N is
reached, after which it follows &r.
Note that {st(s,5)}n1n#0, VsES\N, since (a,O)EN and (0,b)EI, Va,b>O. For sES\N,
let s be the first node reached from s along {st(s,U)} such that sEN. Then it must be
that n(s)<ik(s). If k(s)>O and (s-)=&(s-) we will say that & is "compatible" with &
at s. When & and & are not compatible at s, then redefine & so that firm A
produces when the sum of stocks is odd, instead of even. With this redefinition in mind
we can state: VsES\N there exists an alternating profile a0 which is compatible with & in
the sense that they both have the same firm producing at the first node reached from s
under & that lies in N. With & so defined, let tA'(s)={st(s,&)}UN and let c[s] be a
strategy profile defined on s(s) so that: a[s](s')=ý(s'), Vs'EN, and o[s](s')=&(s'),
Vs'E A(s)\N. In words, for given sES\N, a[s] is the profile defined on the union of N
and the compatible alternating path from s, such that it generates alternation outside of
N, and follows & on N. It is obvious that -(s) is closed to deviation from a[s], and
that a[s] generates a collusive path from s. We now show that a[s]EE A(s).
Clearly we need only be conerned with points s' E f(s)\N. The proof of Theorem 2
showed that it pays to deviate from alternation only when the payoff at the node reached
without deviating exceeds (~1 ). Neither firm's payoff exceeds this bound at s. At anywithoers.Atan
predecessor of s and successor of s along the path {st(s,^)}, each firm's payoff consists of
receiving # on alternate dates until the node i is reached, and hence may be written:
3(1- 62t)/(1-62)+ tV(ai)(/3( 12t)/(1-62)+ 2t/3( )3( ), in view of the fact that
E56/(1+6). So neither firm will deviate from a[s] anywhere on f (s). Hence
E[s]E| If(s). By Theorem 1, 3 LEE such that a[s]r= on ,f(s), and so sEM*. o
Derivation of Equation (5.2):
We seek w*(y)hI im{h. mk(s(hR ) )}. From the implicit definition of {mk} given
in equation (A.2), and the properties of the MPE a* established in the proof of Theorem
3, we conclude that m(s)=m*(s) if and oldy if the following condition holds:
(A.3) 36 e (s)+1 . 1-62k(s) > Max 1-6t +t. l+m(s-t (1,1)). 1-62(k(s)-t)l
176 1 < t<k ) + 6t 6  m -t( ))j
> ,')+2 162k(s)T
(A.3) states that firm i(s) does better to wait for O(c) from s than to produce (and to
continue producing until waiting becomes optimal), but that this would not be so if the
wait were one period longer. In view of the fact that h.k(so(h,R))-.y, as h-O0, we have that
h.m(s) -w*(y) as h.k(s)-4y in (A.3). In other words, (5.2) is obtained from (A.3) by
letting h-40 in the latter, identifying w*(y) with lim{h.m(s)}, and y with lim{h-k(s)}.
The key to the derivation is the observation that h. t-•O as h-+O. Assuming this is
true for the moment, the limit of the RHS of the first inequality in (A.3) can be evaluated
using calculus. Introduce the infinitesmaris dyrh.t and dwh. [m(s)-m(s-t. (1,1))] for h=O;
let h.m(s)-4w* and h.k(s)-+y as h-40. In the text we noted that, by taking limits in (4.4)
1 12rvthe waiting time defined in (4.5) satisfies: h m(s)-x+)n[+(E-)e2ry]=w(x,y), as h.k(s)-.y
and h.n(s)-+x. Therefore, simple differentiation yields the following:
(i) dw P w(x,y)-w(x,y-dy) •-x,y) dy = 2 (2 c-1)e2ry .dy [1-u(y)].dy,
1+(2-l)e 2ryJ
where u(y)E[1-(2c-1 e2ry]/[l+( 2c-1)e 2ry]. Now, using the definition of 6(h) and 3(h)
and taking h=0, (A.3 becomes:
-rw* 1--- 2ry dy + -rdy -r(w*-dw) [1-2r(y-dy(ii) e- 2r edy + e' -e [ 2r
Note that (ii) has the intuitive interpretation that firm i, with capacity y, is indifferent
between waiting w* units of time to share the market, or producing for a short interval
and waiting thereafter. Letting dy-t0 in (ii), and using (i) yields the following:
(iii) 0 = e - ew .[.(1-e-2ry).u(y) + e- 2 ry].
It is easy to see that (iii) implies (5.2).
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Notice that u(O)=(1-e)/e<1; u'(y)<O; and u(y)=O, for y--In(2E-1)/2r. So there
is a unique :E(O,y) satisfying: [2c-u(i)]/[2-u()] = e- 2ry. For y>j the value of w*(y)
implied by (iii) is negative, so the first inequality in (A.3) fails when h is sufficiently
small, and hence w*(y)=0. Finally, we must verify the presumption that h*t-+0 as h-+O,
upon which the above argument is based. This presumption is valid if, for h.0 and firm i
indifferent between producing and waiting, producing for any positive interval leaves it at a
point where waiting is preferred. This is equivalent to the requirement:
O[w*(y)-w(x,y)]/6y < 0 whenever w*(y)=w(x,y).
But by (iii), w*(y) is decreasing, while by (i), w(x,y) is increasing in y. o
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